Alcaide, Almudena, Estevez Tapiador, Juan, Hernandez-Castro, Julio C., Ribagorda, Arturo (2008) Cryptanalysis of Syverson's Rational Exchange Protocol. International Journal of Network Security, 7 (2). pp. 151-156. ISSN 2152-5064. (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:31956)
Abstract
The notion of rational exchange introduced by Syverson
in 1998 is a particularly interesting alternative when an
e?cient scheme for fair exchange is required but the existence of a trusted third party simply cannot be assumed.
A rational exchange protocol cannot provide true fairness,
but it ensures that rational –i.e. self-interested– parties
would have no reason to deviate from the protocol. In
this paper, we identify some weaknesses in Syverson’s rational exchange protocol which were neither detected by
the original author nor by subsequent analysis. After presenting some attacks, we indicate how the scheme should
be modi?ed to overcome these vulnerabilities. We also
provide a formal analysis of our enhancement using BAN
logic.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Uncontrolled keywords: | Cryptanalysis, fair exchange, rational exchange, replay attacks |
Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA 75 Electronic computers. Computer science |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Computing, Engineering and Mathematical Sciences > School of Computing |
Depositing User: | Julio Hernandez Castro |
Date Deposited: | 24 Oct 2012 13:29 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 10:14 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/31956 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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