Sanfey, Peter (1993) On the interaction between efficiency wages and union firm bargaining models. Economics Letters, 41 (3). pp. 319-324. ISSN 0165-1765. (doi:10.1016/0165-1765(93)90160-E) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:20656)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90160-E |
Abstract
Even when efficiency wage considerations are taken into account, firms may have no incentive to pay wages above the competitive minimum. The total value of output therefore may be increased if workers in the efficiency wage sector also possess bargaining power. Efficiency wage and insider-outsider models may also reinforce each other.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90160-E |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | O.O. Odanye |
Date Deposited: | 25 Jul 2009 01:40 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 09:58 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/20656 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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