A Consistent Way with Paradox

Goldstein, Laurence (2009) A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies, 144 (3). pp. 377-389. ISSN 0031-8116. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9215-3) (Full text available)


Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Paradox; Consistent; Cassationist; Liar; No-no; Buridan
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Laurence Goldstein
Date Deposited: 20 Nov 2009 14:44 UTC
Last Modified: 06 Sep 2011 03:09 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/19651 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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