A Consistent Way with Paradox

Goldstein, Laurence (2009) A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies, 144 (3). pp. 377-389. ISSN 0031-8116. (doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9215-3) (KAR id:19651)

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9215-3

Abstract

Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.

Item Type:	Article
DOI/Identification number:	10.1007/s11098-008-9215-3
Uncontrolled keywords:	Paradox; Consistent; Cassationist; Liar; No-no; Buridan
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Institutional Unit:	Schools > Language Centre
Former Institutional Unit:	Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User:	Laurence Goldstein
Date Deposited:	20 Nov 2009 14:44 UTC
Last Modified:	20 May 2025 08:48 UTC
Resource URI:	https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/19651 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

University of Kent Author Information

Goldstein, Laurence.

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