Cartwright, Edward, Wooders, Myrna (2009) On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium. International Journal of Game Theory, 38 (1). pp. 127-136. ISSN 0020-7276. (doi:10.1007/s00182-008-0149-y) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:15476)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0149-y |
Abstract
Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable strategy vector implies the existence of an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies that is also expost stable. Through examples we demonstrate the ‘bounds obtained on the approximation’ are tight.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1007/s00182-008-0149-y |
Uncontrolled keywords: | Semi-anonymous games; Purification; Expost Nash; Bayesian equilibrium |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Edward Cartwright |
Date Deposited: | 27 Nov 2009 10:04 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 09:50 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/15476 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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