Koalitionsstabilität in 15 europäischen Demokratien von 1945 bis 1999: Transaktionskosten und Koalitionsmanagement

Based on a new comparative data set on coalition governance in 15 European parliamentary and semi-presidential systems (1945-1999), the article provides the first quantitative cross-national examination of the link between institutions of coalition governance (e.g., the existence and nature of coalition agreements and coalition committees) and the dynamics of behavioural cabinet terminations. The article contributes to a growing body of scholarship interested in the process of governing in coalitions in the interval between cabinet formation and termination. After constructing a transaction-cost framework for the investigation, techniques of event-history analysis are used to uncover hitherto unreported duration-dependent bivariate interactions between these variables. Estimating the effect of theoretically relevant constitutional norms on the hazard rate of behavioural coalition terminations, the article also demonstrates in multi-variate analyses that positive parliamentarism and the power of governments to table last amendments in the legislative process reduce the risk of early cabinet terminations, whereas the head of government’s unilateral power to dissolve parliament and constitutional unanimity rules in cabinet-decision making increase this risk.