Williamson, Jon (2007) Motivating Objective Bayesianism: From Empirical Constraints to Objective Probabilities. In: Harper, W.L. and Wheeler, G.R., eds. Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg Jr. College Publications, London, UK, pp. 155-183. ISBN 978-1-904987-18-5. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:1291)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. |
Abstract
Objective Bayesian methodology is widely used in statistics, physics, engineering and artificial intelligence. However, every justification for this method has contained glaring holes. This paper offered an entirely new, decision-theoretic justification of objective Bayesianism.
Kyburg goes half-way towards objective Bayesianism. He accepts that frequencies constrain rational belief to an interval but stops short of isolating an optimal degree of belief within this interval. I examine the case for going the whole hog.
Item Type: | Book section |
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Additional information: | This paper offered an entirely new, decision-theoretic justification of objective Bayesianism. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages |
Depositing User: | Maureen Nunn |
Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2007 18:50 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 09:31 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1291 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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