Self-knowledge, Normativity, and Construction

Tanney, Julia (2002) Self-knowledge, Normativity, and Construction. In: Logic, Thought and Language. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 37-55. ISBN 978-0-521-52966-2. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

Abstract

This article develops the idea that the ‘compossibility of objectivity, discovery, and invention’ is part of our ordinary (non-theoretical, non-scientific) understanding of the mental. Contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind, which are broadly speaking “realist” fail to make sense of this compossibility: they fail, in particular, to make sense of the inventive aspects of self-ascription. The invited article is in a small collection published by the Royal Institute of Philosophy as a supplement to the journal Philosophy. This particular volume is remarkable as it includes articles from a number of eminent philosophers, including R.M. Sainsbury, David Wiggins, Gregory McCulloch, Crispin Wright, Christopher Peacocke, Timothy Williams, and Charles Travis.

Item Type:	Book section
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Divisions:	Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User:	Maureen Nunn
Date Deposited:	19 Dec 2007 18:49 UTC
Last Modified:	28 May 2019 13:36 UTC
Resource URI:	https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1238 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)