Tanney, Julia (2002) Self-knowledge, Normativity, and Construction. In: Logic, Thought and Language. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 37-55. ISBN 978-0-521-52966-2. (doi:10.1017/s1358246100008079) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:1238)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008079 |
Abstract
This article develops the idea that the ‘compossibility of objectivity, discovery, and invention’ is part of our ordinary (non-theoretical, non-scientific) understanding of the mental. Contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind, which are broadly speaking “realist” fail to make sense of this compossibility: they fail, in particular, to make sense of the inventive aspects of self-ascription. The invited article is in a small collection published by the Royal Institute of Philosophy as a supplement to the journal Philosophy. This particular volume is remarkable as it includes articles from a number of eminent philosophers, including R.M. Sainsbury, David Wiggins, Gregory McCulloch, Crispin Wright, Christopher Peacocke, Timothy Williams, and Charles Travis.
Item Type: | Book section |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1017/s1358246100008079 |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages |
Depositing User: | Maureen Nunn |
Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2007 18:49 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 09:31 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1238 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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