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Why Reasons May Not be Causes

Tanney, Julia (1995) Why Reasons May Not be Causes. Mind and Language, 10 (1/2). pp. 103-126. ISSN 0268-1064. E-ISSN 1468-0017. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007.x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:11280)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007...

Abstract

This paper considers Davidson’s (1963) arguments for construing reasons as causes and attempts to

rationalizing explanation. I consider various ways of spelling out his intuition that something is

and I argue that to the extent that there is anything missing, it should not be provided by construing

determinate relation between explanans and explanandum. I argue that this is too strong a requirement

to place on rationalizing explanation.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007.x
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Julia Tanney
Date Deposited: 24 Oct 2009 18:25 UTC
Last Modified: 28 May 2019 13:48 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/11280 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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