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Why Reasons May Not be Causes

Tanney, Julia (1995) Why Reasons May Not be Causes. Mind and Language, 10 (1/2). pp. 103-126. ISSN 0268-1064. E-ISSN 1468-0017. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007.x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:11280)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007...

Abstract

This paper considers Davidson’s (1963) arguments for construing reasons as causes and attempts to

show that he has failed to provide positive reasons for introducing causation into his analysis of

rationalizing explanation. I consider various ways of spelling out his intuition that something is

missing from explanation if we consider only the justificatory relation between reasons and action,

and I argue that to the extent that there is anything missing, it should not be provided by construing

reasons as causes. What is ostensibly missing, and what I think Davidson is after, is some kind of

determinate relation between explanans and explanandum. I argue that this is too strong a requirement

to place on rationalizing explanation.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007.x
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Julia Tanney
Date Deposited: 24 Oct 2009 18:25 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:49 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/11280 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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