Why Reasons May Not be Causes

Tanney, Julia (1995) Why Reasons May Not be Causes. Mind and Language, 10 (1/2). pp. 103-126. ISSN 0268-1064. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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This paper considers Davidson’s (1963) arguments for construing reasons as causes and attempts to show that he has failed to provide positive reasons for introducing causation into his analysis of rationalizing explanation. I consider various ways of spelling out his intuition that something is missing from explanation if we consider only the justificatory relation between reasons and action, and I argue that to the extent that there is anything missing, it should not be provided by construing reasons as causes. What is ostensibly missing, and what I think Davidson is after, is some kind of determinate relation between explanans and explanandum. I argue that this is too strong a requirement to place on rationalizing explanation.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Julia Tanney
Date Deposited: 24 Oct 2009 18:25
Last Modified: 08 Nov 2014 13:02
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/11280 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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