Tanney, Julia (1995) Why Reasons May Not be Causes. Mind and Language, 10 (1/2). pp. 103-126. ISSN 0268-1064. E-ISSN 1468-0017. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007.x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:11280)
| The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
| Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007... |
Abstract
This paper considers Davidson’s (1963) arguments for construing reasons as causes and attempts to
show that he has failed to provide positive reasons for introducing causation into his analysis of
rationalizing explanation. I consider various ways of spelling out his intuition that something is
missing from explanation if we consider only the justificatory relation between reasons and action,
and I argue that to the extent that there is anything missing, it should not be provided by construing
reasons as causes. What is ostensibly missing, and what I think Davidson is after, is some kind of
determinate relation between explanans and explanandum. I argue that this is too strong a requirement
to place on rationalizing explanation.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| DOI/Identification number: | 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007.x |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion |
| Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages |
| Depositing User: | Julia Tanney |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Oct 2009 18:25 UTC |
| Last Modified: | 16 Nov 2021 09:49 UTC |
| Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/11280 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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