A Critical Examination of the Concept of Autonomy in Law and Legal Theory

This thesis concerns the meaning of autonomy. As the scope, mention and significance of autonomy have increased in recent years, the meaning of autonomy has itself been subject to increasing academic attention in law, as elsewhere. Far from consensus, this scholarly interest has resulted only in contestation and confusion, universally acknowledged. The present thesis argues that the cause of present frustration concerning autonomy is logical and semantic error at a fundamental level. In short, present scholarship seeking to articulate autonomy has neglected the insight on which modern logic and attendant conceptual analysis depends - Frege’s distinction between sense and reference. In consequence, theorists all happen to deploy a referential theory of meaning, thus producing multiple accounts of ‘autonomy’ that inadvertently track the autonomous objects that command theorists’ primary interest. Predictably, as accounts proliferate, disagreement and confusion has multiplied, to the detriment of the significant work the concept is intended to deliver in law and beyond. Tracing my hypothesis through the work of key theorists, I propose a rival account of autonomy simply as self-governance, with the literature field itself standing in striking support of the claim, once account has been made for the Fregean oversight. The thesis demonstrates the non-trivial nature of the point in relation to arguments in law, showing the explanatory power of the account in resolution of contemporary debates in these domains.