Closing In on open texture

This thesis concerns the notion of 'open texture'. Originally introduced within the philosophy of language by Friedrich Waismann in 1945, open texture referred to a special type of 'possible vagueness' in language. Then, HLA Hart referred to 'the open texture of law' in The Concept of Law (1961). Hart's notion has since caused confusion within legal scholarship, as Hart is unclear whether he is referring to the same phenomenon as Waismann - that the open texture of the language used by law is what causes the open texture of law - or whether laws and rules are open-textured in a way similar to, yet distinct from, the open texture of language. In this thesis, I argue that Waismann and Hart are writing about different phenomena, for different purposes. Hart's open texture of law bears more similarity to legal scholarship about vagueness in the law generally, than to Waismann's anti-verificationist philosophy of language. Further, I argue that the confusion begins with the mistranslation of 'open texture' from the original German Porosität der Begriffe. This mistranslation fails to capture a fundamental aspect of the original phrase; that this 'porosity' is a feature of concepts in language specifically. Instead, translating Porosität der Begriffe to 'open texture' focuses on openness more broadly, thereby allowing theorists to apply the phrase to contexts beyond its original use. Thus, my thesis aims to provide clarity on open texture as a key aspect of Hart's thesis, refining its sense and scope, and counselling against its over-extension to the strict matters in question in Waismann's anti-verificationist philosophy.