Austen Chamberlain and the Locarno Treaties revisited

The approaching centenary of the Locarno conference in October 1925 provides a convenient reason to re-evaluate the significance of the treaties that emerged from it. Often styled as the ‘real’ peace settlement at the end of the First World War, the treaties of Locarno collectively represent one of the most important attempts to ensure lasting peace in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Central to the treaties’ reputation as the ‘real’ peace settlement is their role in rehabilitating Germany’s Great Powers status after the humiliation suffered at the Paris Peace Conference six years earlier. The Locarno agreements have been seen as one of the rare highpoints in post-First World War Western European diplomacy. They were viewed by contemporaries as a real diplomatic breakthrough that would allow finally for the ghosts of the enmities that had caused the First World War to be laid to rest, although subsequent generations of scholars have been much more critical about what the agreements achieved in the long-term. This article focuses on the contribution made to the conference by the head of the British delegation, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain. It re-examines his diplomatic priorities, especially his reputation as a Francophile. Its central thesis is that Chamberlain himself can be seen to embody the essential reasons why the Locarno agreements were heralded as a success at the time of their conclusion, but less so with the perspective of hindsight. The treaties contained within them two opposing diplomatic forces. On the one hand, the remnants of the pre-war national state system, with its emphasis on diplomatic self-interest, secret, private negotiations, versus the so-called ‘new’ diplomacy: international, open, democratic and accountable. This rendered most of the European diplomatic problems in the post-First World War era intractable; indeed that they were incapable of resolution by anyone. Chamberlain’s entire engagement with the western European security question during the mid-1920s can be seen as evidence not only of those tensions but of the futility of trying to resolve them.