Sociology, embodiment and morality: A Durkheimian perspective

Durkheim is often associated with the ‘old’ sociology of morality but a fresh engagement with the embodied dimensions of his work can bring theoretical clarity to the contemporary field. In undertaking this task, our argument proceeds through three stages. Firstly, we demonstrate how Durkheim’s explanatory homo duplex model insists that biological and social factors combine to constitute morality. Secondly, we analyse how this model provides the basis for a broader explanatory account that resists reductionist ‘substantive’ assessments of diverse moral systems to focus on them as cultural systems. Finally, we explore how his approach facilitates the analysis of competing moral solidarities within as well as across contemporary societies. Having reappraised Durkheim’s account, we suggest that the sociology of morality should be inclusive of insights from other disciplines but also synthetic, resisting various forms of reductionism in favour of a distinctively sociological model reflective of the fact that human beings are, simultaneously, natural and cultural creatures.