A spanner in the works : a critique of social psychology.

A critique is made of experimental social psychology in which its claim to give a "deep" understanding of human social behaviour is examined, and found to be groundless. Social psychology's methodological and theoretical assumptions are traced to the work of Kurt Lewin, whose advocacy of a "Galilean", scientific approach to psychology seemed to allow the use of experimentation on human motivations and higher order thought processes. Examples of contemporary social psychological research are examined, revealing the implicit Lewinian assumptions they make use of It is shown that Lewin's assumptions are without foundation, because they distort acknowledged facts about human beings by their imposition of a causal explanatory system onto all instances of behaviour. Lewin's "topological psychology" involves, amongst other things, the translation of common sense notions into a quasi-technical terminology. It is contended that this terminology contributes nothing to a more sophisticated understanding of people's behaviour. This contention is supported by an examination of the methodological implications associated with Lewin's terminology, and also by contrasting it with accounts that emphasize the diversity of explanatory forms in ordinary use. It is also shown, through a discussion of philosophical skepticism, that social psychology's justifications for assuming a fundamental inadequacy of common sense knowledge of behaviour, and the appropriateness of a general scientific approach to behaviour, are over-extended, and that while the motivations of behaviour are not always readily apparent, there is no serious reason to disregard all ordinary explanations of behaviour. Having shown the weaknesses inherent in social psychology's assumptions and justifications, it is concluded that social psychology cannot claim to have discovered a replacement for ordinary, common sense, explanations of behaviour.