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Multi-option descending clock auction

Nguyen, Tri-Dung, Sandholm, Tuomas (2016) Multi-option descending clock auction. In: Proceedings of 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016. . pp. 1461-1462. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) ISBN 978-1-4503-4239-1. (doi:10.5555/2936924.2937210) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:92920)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL:
https://dx.doi.org/10.5555/2936924.2937210

Abstract

A descending clock auction (DCA) is for buying items from multiple sellers. The literature has focused on the case where each bidder has two options: to accept or reject the offered price. However, in many settings-such as the FCC's imminent incentive auction-each bidder may be able to sell one from a set of options. We present a multi-option DCA (MDCA) framework where at each round, the auctioneer offers each bidder different prices for different options, and a bidder may find multiple options still acceptable. Setting prices during a MDCA is trickier than in a DCA. We develop a Markov chain model for the dynamics of each bidder's state (which options are still acceptable). We leverage it to optimize the trajectory of price offers to different bidders for different options. This is unlike most auctions which only compute the next price vector. Computing the trajectory enables better planning. We reoptimize the trajectory after each round. Each optimization minimizes total payment while ensuring feasibility in a stochastic sense. We also introduce percentile-based approaches to decrementing prices. Experiments with real FCC incentive auction interference constraint data show that the optimization-based approach dramatically outperforms the percentile-based approach - because it takes feasibility into account in pricing. Both pricing techniques scale to the large. Copyright © 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

Item Type: Conference or workshop item (Paper)
DOI/Identification number: 10.5555/2936924.2937210
Uncontrolled keywords: Auction optimization, Combinatorial auction, Descending clock auction, Incentive auction, Planned auction trajectory, Pricing, Spectrum auction, Autonomous agents, Clocks, Markov processes, Multi agent systems, Stochastic systems, Trajectories, Combinatorial auction, Descending clock auction, Incentive auction, Interference constraints, Markov chain models, Price vectors, Spectrum auctions, Costs
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Divisions > Kent Business School - Division > Department of Analytics, Operations and Systems
Depositing User: Tri-Dung Nguyen
Date Deposited: 17 Mar 2022 15:30 UTC
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2022 12:22 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/92920 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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