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Practical Irrationality, Reflexivity and Sartre's Regress Argument

Thomas, Alan P. (2007) Practical Irrationality, Reflexivity and Sartre's Regress Argument. Teorema, XXVI (3). ISSN 0210-1602. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:9005)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.

Abstract

Sartre famously criticised Freud's model of repression as involving an infinite regress. The postulation of a mechanism of repression does not solve the problem of how a person can both be influenced by a repressed thought (hence be aware of it) but not be aware of it (because it has been repressed). It is argued that it is Sartre's argument that leads to an infinite regress. This becomes clear if one focuses on his implicit model of rational control of thought. In assuming that thoughts we are conscious with are thoughts we are conscious of Sartre makes a representative mistake. This paper describes an understanding of Freudian repression that is not vulnerable to Sartre's critique.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Alan Thomas
Date Deposited: 27 Jun 2008 14:15 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:47 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/9005 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

University of Kent Author Information

Thomas, Alan P..

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