The four powers multinational force in Lebanon 1982-84 : peacekeeping or intervention

The purpose of this thesis has been to carry out a case study of the Multinational Force in Beirut as an experiment of a non-United Nations peacekeeping technique in the management of that country's protracted conflict It aims to assess why the Multinational Force may have succeeded or failed in its mission, with a view to recording these factors of success and failure - in such a way that future peacekeeping operations can benefit from them. Thus, the analysis offered grapples the thorny issue of whether the Multinational Force in Beirut was a 'peacekeeping force', an 'interventionist action', or was it 'an adjunct to or instrument of a policy designed for peacemaking'. To acquaint the reader with the experiment in and experience of the Multinational Force we emphasise that its very 'presence' brought a new actor into the Lebanon conflict. Hence, the subsequent effects of the Force on the already present internal and external protagonists are taken up. Furthermore, special emphasis was placed on the political and diplomatic circumstances leading to the decision and deployment of the Force, the nature of its mandate, and the ultimate disposition of its operations. Whilst stressing that non-U.N. peacekeeping in the Lebanon conflict has come to mean whatever those apply have wished it to mean, the study concludes by arguing that the Multinational Force in Beirut came to an unhappy end because it departed from the traditional modes of peacekeeping. Its demise did not occur in a vacuum, nor was the Force another victim of the Lebanon conflict The destiny of the Multinational Force was not necessarily failure and yet its presence, rather than facilitating peace, proved to be a catalyst for the outbreak of war