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Distinguishing value-neutrality from value-independence: toward a new disentangling strategy for moral epistemology

Radoilska, Lubomira V. (2020) Distinguishing value-neutrality from value-independence: toward a new disentangling strategy for moral epistemology. In: Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. (In press) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:84856)

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Abstract

This chapter outlines a new disentangling strategy for moral epistemology. It builds on the fundamental distinction between value-neutrality and value-independence as two separate aspects of methodological austerity introduced by Matthew Kramer. This type of conceptual analysis is then applied to two major challenges in moral epistemology: globalised scepticism and debate fragmentation. Both challenges arise from collapsing the fact/value dichotomy. They can be addressed by comprehensive disentangling that runs along both dimensions – value neutrality vs. value non-neutrality and value independence vs. value dependence. The success of this strategy rests on two factors. The first is broadening the scope of disentangling to include theoretical-explanatory values on a par with distinctly ethical values. The second is differentiating between wider and narrower conceptualisations of what value neutrality requires with respect to contested matters. The objective is to pre-empt unjust theorising, a distinctive form of epistemic injustice that derives from the exclusive methodological focus on ethical evaluations at the expense of epistemic ones. When these methodological conditions are fulfilled, opponents should gain the confidence to treat each other as fellow inquirers engaged in the same project, that of reducing the scope of unhelpful disagreements.

Item Type: Book section
Projects: Projects 22746 not found.
Uncontrolled keywords: conceptual analysis; disagreement; disentangling; fact/value distinction; epistemic injustice; moral epistemology; unjust theorising
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Lubomira Radoilska
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2020 10:14 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2021 14:17 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/84856 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Radoilska, Lubomira V.: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6442-0459
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