# Refuse Disposal

Goldstein, Laurence (2002) Refuse Disposal. Analysis, 62 (3). pp. 236-241. ISSN 0003-2638. (doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00362) (KAR id:8296)

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## Abstract

When Kripke asks: Does Pierre or does he not believe that London is beautiful?’, we should refuse to answer simply Yes’ or `No’, for, knowing the Pierre story, we know that anything other than a qualified reply will be distorting. If asked whether it is true or false that the Barber of Alcala (who shaves all and only those villagers who do not shave themselves) shaves himself, we should, again, refuse to answer, since, provably, no such barber exists. It turns out that a principled refusal to ascribe a truth-value (which is not the same as ascribing a different truth-value) is the key to disposing of many paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants.

Item Type: Article 10.1111/1467-8284.00362 B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages Laurence Goldstein 02 Oct 2008 09:42 UTC 28 May 2019 13:44 UTC https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/8296 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)