Goldstein, Laurence (2002) Refuse Disposal. Analysis, 62 (3). pp. 236-241. ISSN 0003-2638. (doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00362) (KAR id:8296)
Microsoft Word
Language: English |
|
Download this file (Microsoft Word/40kB) |
![]() |
Request a format suitable for use with assistive technology e.g. a screenreader | |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8284.00362 |
Abstract
When Kripke asks: `Does Pierre or does he not believe that London is beautiful?’, we should refuse to answer simply `Yes’ or `No’, for, knowing the Pierre story, we know that anything other than a qualified reply will be distorting. If asked whether it is true or false that the Barber of Alcala (who shaves all and only those villagers who do not shave themselves) shaves himself, we should, again, refuse to answer, since, provably, no such barber exists. It turns out that a principled refusal to ascribe a truth-value (which is not the same as ascribing a different truth-value) is the key to disposing of many paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
DOI/Identification number: | 10.1111/1467-8284.00362 |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages |
Depositing User: | Laurence Goldstein |
Date Deposited: | 02 Oct 2008 09:42 UTC |
Last Modified: | 16 Nov 2021 09:46 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/8296 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
- Link to SensusAccess
- Export to:
- RefWorks
- EPrints3 XML
- BibTeX
- CSV
- Depositors only (login required):