Skip to main content

Auctions with External Incentives:Experimental Evidence

Fonseca, A. Miguel, Giovannoni, Francesco, Makris, Miltiadis (2020) Auctions with External Incentives:Experimental Evidence. International Journal of Game Theory, . ISSN 0020-7276. E-ISSN 1432-1270. (doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00725-1) (KAR id:82002)

PDF Publisher pdf
Language: English


Creative Commons Licence
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Download (2MB) Preview
PDF Author's Accepted Manuscript
Language: English

Restricted to Repository staff only
Contact us about this Publication
Official URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00725-1

Abstract

We consider auctions where bidders’ valuations are positively correlated with their productivity in a second-stage aftermarket. We test in the lab whether bidders recognize the opportunity to signal their productivity through their bidding and, conditional on them doing so, whether disclosing different information about the auction outcomes affects their signaling behavior. Our results confirm that bidders recognise the signalling opportunities they face and also react to differences in the way their bidding behavior is disclosed, although not always in a way that is consistent with theoretical predictions.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s00182-020-00725-1
Uncontrolled keywords: auctions, signaling, disclosure, experiments
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Miltos Makris
Date Deposited: 06 Jul 2020 09:12 UTC
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2020 12:42 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/82002 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Makris, Miltiadis: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1021-841X
  • Depositors only (login required):