Skip to main content

An attack-defense game on interdependent networks

Peng, Rui, Wu, Di, Sun, Mengyao, Wu, Shaomin (2020) An attack-defense game on interdependent networks. Journal of Operational Research Society, . ISSN 0160-5682. (doi:10.1080/01605682.2020.1784048) (KAR id:81743)

PDF Author's Accepted Manuscript
Language: English


Download (961kB) Preview
[thumbnail of An attack-defense game on interdependent networks.pdf]
Preview
This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology.
Request an accessible format
Official URL
https://doi.org/10.1080/01605682.2020.1784048

Abstract

This paper analyzes the optimal strategies for an attacker and a defender in an attack-defense game on a network consisting of interdependent subnetworks. The defender moves first and allocates its resource to protect the network nodes. The attacker then moves and allocates its resources to attack the network nodes. The binary decision diagram is employed to obtain all potential states of the network system after attack. Considering each of its opponent’s strategies, the game player tries to maximize its own cumulative prospect value. The backward induction method is employed to obtain the game players’ optimal strategies, respectively. Different resource relationships are analyzed to testify the robustness of the main conclusions and players’ risk attitudes are also investigated. Numerical examples are used to illustrate the analysis.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1080/01605682.2020.1784048
Uncontrolled keywords: attack-defense game; interdependent network; nodes; binary decision diagram; prospect value
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HA Statistics > HA33 Management Science
Divisions: Divisions > Kent Business School - Division > Kent Business School (do not use)
Depositing User: Shaomin Wu
Date Deposited: 17 Jun 2020 07:14 UTC
Last Modified: 15 Jun 2021 23:00 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/81743 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Wu, Shaomin: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9786-3213
  • Depositors only (login required):

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year