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A Bayesian account of establishing

Williamson, Jon (2020) A Bayesian account of establishing. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, . ISSN 0007-0882. E-ISSN 1464-3537. (In press) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:81135)

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Language: English

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Abstract

When a proposition is established, it can be taken as evidence for other propositions. Can the Bayesian theory of rational belief and action provide an account of establishing? I argue that it can, but only if the Bayesian is willing to endorse objective constraints on both probabilities and utilities, and willing to deny that it is rationally permissible to defer wholesale to expert opinion. I develop a new account of deference that accommodates this latter requirement.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA273 Probabilities
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 06 May 2020 08:55 UTC
Last Modified: 01 Jul 2020 13:50 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/81135 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Williamson, Jon: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0514-4209
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