Williamson, Jon (2020) A Bayesian account of establishing. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, . ISSN 0007-0882. E-ISSN 1464-3537. (In press) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:81135)
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Abstract
When a proposition is established, it can be taken as evidence for other propositions. Can the Bayesian theory of rational belief and action provide an account of establishing? I argue that it can, but only if the Bayesian is willing to endorse objective constraints on both probabilities and utilities, and willing to deny that it is rationally permissible to defer wholesale to expert opinion. I develop a new account of deference that accommodates this latter requirement.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Subjects: |
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA273 Probabilities |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy |
| Depositing User: | Jon Williamson |
| Date Deposited: | 06 May 2020 08:55 UTC |
| Last Modified: | 01 Jul 2020 13:50 UTC |
| Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/81135 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
| Williamson, Jon: |  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0514-4209 |
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