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The Politics of Fiscal Monitoring

Belling, Benjamin Daniel Sebastian (2020) The Politics of Fiscal Monitoring. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent,. (KAR id:80357)

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Language: English


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Abstract

The last decade saw a rise in the number of expert bodies with a public mandate to monitor fiscal policy, aiming at mitigating the alleged overspending bias of politicians. In contrast to the existing literature this thesis claims that policy monitoring is inherently political. I develop an understanding of policy watchdog bodies as non-majoritarian institutions and emphasise the reciprocal nature between policymakers and the experts serving in these bodies. The Politics of Fiscal Monitoring approach developed here acknowledges that the origins, structure and remits of fiscal watchdog bodies as well as the selection of and responsiveness to its experts are driven by political strategies and compromise. Based on a new dataset this thesis demonstrates in three distinct research articles and a research note that the monitoring capacity of fiscal watchdog bodies can be traced back to its political roots; that policymakers select watchdog experts based on political loyalty; and that elected officials are more responsive to experts if their advice is politically beneficial.

Item Type: Thesis (Doctor of Philosophy (PhD))
Thesis advisor: Morgan-Jones, Edward
Thesis advisor: Grundig, Frank
Uncontrolled keywords: fiscal monitoring, public finances, fiscal policymaking, experts, institutional choice, non-majoritarian institutions, political independence, economists, comparative political economy
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
SWORD Depositor: System Moodle
Depositing User: System Moodle
Date Deposited: 05 Mar 2020 11:10 UTC
Last Modified: 06 Mar 2020 09:59 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/80357 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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