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Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism

Båve, Arvid (2017) Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly, 67 (266). pp. 1-21. ISSN 0031-8094. (doi:10.1093/pq/pqw029) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:79746)

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Abstract

It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of refutation. I focus particularly on one such theory, which takes concepts to be event types that are individuated by their psychological roles, which has the resources of responding to each of the more specific worries Bealer expresses.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1093/pq/pqw029
Uncontrolled keywords: self-consciousness, functionalism, mind-body problem, materialism, conceptual role semantics, inferentialism
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Arvid Bave
Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2020 20:58 UTC
Last Modified: 06 May 2020 03:20 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/79746 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Båve, Arvid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7570-2697
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