Skip to main content

The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism

Wallmann, Christian, Williamson, Jon (2020) The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 10 (1). ISSN 1879-4920. (doi:10.1007/s13194-019-0266-4) (KAR id:79008)

PDF Publisher pdf
Language: English

Creative Commons Licence
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Download (395kB) Preview
PDF Author's Accepted Manuscript
Language: English

Restricted to Repository staff only
Contact us about this Publication
Official URL


This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support to this version of objective Bayesianism.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s13194-019-0266-4
Uncontrolled keywords: Bayesianism, Principal principle, Subjective Bayesianism, Objective Bayesianism, Pooling
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA273 Probabilities
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 28 Nov 2019 09:41 UTC
Last Modified: 12 Dec 2019 10:54 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Williamson, Jon:
  • Depositors only (login required):


Downloads per month over past year