Connelly, Mark L. and Miller, Walter (2004) The BEF and the issue of surrender on the Western Front in 1940. War in History, 11 (4). pp. 424-441. ISSN 0968-3445. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1191/0968344504wh308oa) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication) | |
Official URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1191/0968344504wh308oa |
Abstract
This article explores the reasons behind the surrenders of large numbers of British troops in the 1940 battle for France and Flanders. The article contends that the surrenders do not indicate poor morale but merely a pragmatic reaction to the situation. British troops fought gallantly and with some skill for as long as the situation appeared reasonable, and surrendered only when resistance no longer seemed to offer any valuable service. The reasons behind this approach to battle are identified in British military training and the structure and philosophy of the entire British army.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | D History General and Old World > DA Great Britain |
Divisions: | Faculties > Humanities > School of History |
Depositing User: | Mark Connelly |
Date Deposited: | 11 Sep 2008 13:29 UTC |
Last Modified: | 13 Oct 2015 15:06 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/7722 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
Connelly, Mark L.: | ![]() |
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