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Contrastivism and Non-Comtrastivism in Scientific Explanation

Shan, Yafeng (2019) Contrastivism and Non-Comtrastivism in Scientific Explanation. Philosophy Compass, 14 (8). ISSN 1747-9991. (doi:10.1111/phc3.12613) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:76187)

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The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanations have to be contrastive in nature (contrastivism). However, others argue that no scientific explanation is genuinely contrastive (non‐contrastivism). In addition, a compatibilist view has been recently devloped. It is argued that the debate between contrastivism and non‐contrastivism is merely a linguistic dispute rather than a genuine disagreement on the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are both contrastive and non‐contrastive in some sense (compatibilism). This paper examines the debate between contrastivism and non‐contrastivism in scientific explanation. It begins with a critical review of the arguments for contrastivism, for non‐contrastivism, and for compatibilism and concludes with some remarks on the prospect of the issue.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1111/phc3.12613
Uncontrolled keywords: scientific explanation contrastive explanation non-contrastive explanation contrastivism non-contrastivism compatibilism why-question
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Yafeng Shan
Date Deposited: 04 Sep 2019 16:43 UTC
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2020 16:07 UTC
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