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Optimal defence-attack strategies between one defender and two attackers

Wu, Di, Yang, Xiangbin, Peng, Rui, Wu, Shaomin (2020) Optimal defence-attack strategies between one defender and two attackers. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 71 (11). pp. 1830-1846. ISSN 0160-5682. (doi:10.1080/01605682.2019.1630332) (KAR id:75325)

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https://doi.org/10.1080/01605682.2019.1630332

Abstract

This paper analyses the optimal strategies for one defender and two attackers in a defence-attack game, where a) the defender allocates its resource into defending against and attacking the two attackers, and b) the two attackers, after observing the action of the defender, allocate their resources into attacking and defending against the defender, on either a cooperative or non-cooperative basis. On a cooperative basis, for each of the defender’s given strategies, the two attackers work together to maximise the sum of their cumulative prospect values while anticipating the eight possible game outcomes. On a non-cooperative basis, for each of the defender’s given strategies, each attacker simultaneously yet independently tries to maximise their own cumulative prospect value. In both cases, the defender maximises its cumulative prospect value while anticipating the attackers’ actions. Backward induction is employed to obtain the optimal defence and attack strategies for all scenarios. Numerical examples are performed to illustrate the applications of the strategies. In general, we find two opposing effects considering the attackers’ strategies and analyse the alteration of strategies for the participants under two different risk preferences: risk-averse and risk seeking. The reasons for the alteration are also performed to illustrate the practical applications.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1080/01605682.2019.1630332
Uncontrolled keywords: Reliability, attack–defence game, resource allocation, cumulative prospect, cooperation
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HA Statistics > HA33 Management Science
Divisions: Divisions > Kent Business School - Division > Kent Business School (do not use)
Depositing User: Shaomin Wu
Date Deposited: 13 Jul 2019 16:24 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2021 14:05 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/75325 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Wu, Shaomin: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9786-3213
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