Skip to main content

Calibration for epistemic causality

Williamson, Jon (2019) Calibration for epistemic causality. Erkenntnis, . Article Number UNSPECIFIED. ISSN 0165-0106. E-ISSN 1572-8420. (doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00139-w) (KAR id:74176)

PDF Publisher pdf
Language: English

Creative Commons Licence
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Download (1MB) Preview
PDF Author's Accepted Manuscript
Language: English

Restricted to Repository staff only
Contact us about this Publication
Official URL


The epistemic theory of causality is analogous to epistemic theories of probability. Most proponents of epistemic probability would argue that one's degrees of belief should be calibrated to chances, insofar as one has evidence of chances. The question arises as to whether causal beliefs should satisfy an analogous calibration norm. In this paper, I formulate a particular version of a norm requiring calibration to chances and argue that this norm is the most fundamental evidential norm for epistemic probability. I then develop an analogous calibration norm for epistemic causality, argue that it is the *only* evidential norm required for epistemic causality, and show how an epistemic account of causality that incorporates this norm can be used to analyse objective causal relationships.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s10670-019-00139-w
Uncontrolled keywords: Causality, causation, Epistemic Causality, Calibration, Principal Principle, philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 30 May 2019 13:16 UTC
Last Modified: 07 Aug 2020 15:12 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Williamson, Jon:
  • Depositors only (login required):