Learning causal relationships

Williamson, Jon (2002) Learning causal relationships. . LSE Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science Online paper (technical report) in Causality: Metaphysics and Methods project (2002 - 2004). (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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http://www.lse.ac.uk/CPNSS/pdf/DP_withCover_Causal...

Abstract

How ought we learn causal relationships? While Popper advocated a hypothetico-deductive logic of causal discovery, inductive accounts are currently in vogue. Many inductive approaches depend on the causal Markov condition as a fundamental assumption. This condition, I maintain, is not universally valid, though it is justifiable as a default assumption. In which case the results of the inductive causal learning procedure must be tested before they can be accepted. This yields a synthesis of the hypothetico-deductive and inductive accounts, which forms the focus of this paper. I discuss the justification of this synthesis and draw an analogy between objective Bayesianism and the account of causal learning presented here.

Item Type: Internet publication
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2011 13:49
Last Modified: 18 May 2015 10:45
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/7365 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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