Dispositional versus Epistemic Causality

Williamson, Jon (2006) Dispositional versus Epistemic Causality. Minds and Machines, 16 . pp. 259-276. ISSN 1572-8641. (doi:10.1007/s11023-006-9033-3) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)

Abstract

I put forward several desiderata that a philosophical theory of causality should satisfy: it should account for the objectivity of causality, it should underpin formalisms for causal reasoning, it should admit a viable epistemology, it should be able to cope with the great variety of causal claims that are made, and it should be ontologically parsimonious. I argue that Nancy Cartwright's dispositional account of causality goes part way towards meeting these criteria but is lacking in important respects. I go on to argue that my epistemic account, which ties causal relationships to an agent's knowledge and ignorance, performs well in the light of the desiderata. Such an account, I claim, is all we require from a theory of causality.

Item Type:	Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User:	Jon Williamson
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2011 13:49
Last Modified:	19 Jun 2015 15:53
Resource URI:	https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/7361 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)