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Share capitalism and worker wellbeing

Bryson, Alex, Clark, Andrew E., Freeman, Richard B., Green, Colin P. (2016) Share capitalism and worker wellbeing. Labour Economics, 42 . pp. 151-158. ISSN 0927-5371. (doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2016.09.002) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.09.002

Abstract

We show that worker wellbeing is determined not only by the amount of compensation workers receive but also by how compensation is determined. While previous theoretical and empirical work has often been preoccupied with individual performance-related pay, we find that the receipt of a range of group-performance schemes (profit shares, group bonuses and share ownership) is associated with higher job satisfaction. This holds conditional on wage levels, so that pay methods are associated with greater job satisfaction in addition to that coming from higher wages. We use a variety of methods to control for unobserved individual and job-specific characteristics. We suggest that half of the share-capitalism effect is accounted for by employees reciprocating for the “gift” we also show that share capitalism helps dampen the negative wellbeing effects of what we typically think of as “bad” aspects of job quality.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1016/j.labeco.2016.09.002
Uncontrolled keywords: Job satisfaction; Wages; Compensation methods; Working conditions
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > Kent Business School > Industrial Relations/HRM
Depositing User: Andrew Clark
Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2018 10:27 UTC
Last Modified: 15 Jul 2019 08:10 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/69176 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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