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Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs: Evidence from Nepal and the DRC

Ansorg, Nadine, Strasheim, Julia (2019) Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs: Evidence from Nepal and the DRC. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 13 (1). pp. 112-130. ISSN 1750-2977. (doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981)

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Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981
Projects: [UNSPECIFIED] Security Sector Reform and the Stability of Post-War Peace
Subjects: J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations > Conflict Analysis Research Centre
Depositing User: Nadine Ansorg
Date Deposited: 17 Jul 2018 09:26 UTC
Last Modified: 29 Nov 2019 04:10 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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