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Justifying the Principle of Indifference

Williamson, Jon (2018) Justifying the Principle of Indifference. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, . ISSN 1879-4920. (doi:10.1007/s13194-018-0201-0) (KAR id:66127)

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Abstract

This paper presents a new argument for the Principle of Indifference. This

the principle as needing to hold if one is to minimise worst-case expected loss,

to minimise worst-case expected inaccuracy. The question arises as to which

Evidentialism and suggest that the relative plausibility of Evidentialism provides

general preference for pragmatic arguments for the Principle of Indifference,

Bayesian epistemology.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s13194-018-0201-0
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 23 Feb 2018 16:38 UTC
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2019 10:43 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/66127 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Williamson, Jon: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0514-4209
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