Reactive Attitudes, Forgiveness and the Second-Person Standpoint

Couto, Alexandra (2016) Reactive Attitudes, Forgiveness and the Second-Person Standpoint. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19 (5). pp. 1309-1323. ISSN 1386-2820. (doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9740-7) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Abstract

Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesn’t repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwall’s second- personal account of morality offers significant theoretical support for the latter view. I argue that if, as Darwall claims, reactive attitudes issue a demand, this demand needs to be adequately answered for forgiveness to be warranted. It follows that we should reject the thesis that unconditional forgiveness is appropriate in the absence of repentance.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s10677-016-9740-7
Uncontrolled keywords: forgiveness, reactive attitudes, Darwall, second-person
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Alexandra Couto
Date Deposited: 13 Oct 2017 19:19 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 19:41 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/63997 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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