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The Beneficiary Pays Principle and Strict Liability: exploring the normative significance of causal relations

Couto, Alexandra (2017) The Beneficiary Pays Principle and Strict Liability: exploring the normative significance of causal relations. Philosophical Studies, . ISSN 0031-8116. E-ISSN 1573-0883. (doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0953-y)

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0953-y

Abstract

I will discuss the relationship between two different accounts of remedial duty ascriptions. According to one account, the beneficiary account, individuals who benefit innocently from injustices ought to bear remedial responsibilities towards the victims of these injustices. According to another account, the causal account, individuals who caused injustices (even innocently) ought to bear remedial duties towards the victim. In this paper, I examine the relation between the principles central to these accounts: the Beneficiary Principle and the well- established principle of Strict Liability in law. I argue that both principles display a strong yet unexplored similarity as they make certain kinds of causal connection sufficient for incurring liability. Because of this similarity, I suggest that insights into the Beneficiary Principle can be gained from exploring its relation with Strict Liability. In particular, I examine two new positive arguments that can be made in support of the Beneficiary Principle. I will also, however, point out limits to what these arguments can establish.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s11098-017-0953-y
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Alexandra Couto
Date Deposited: 13 Oct 2017 14:03 UTC
Last Modified: 09 Jul 2019 08:51 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/63993 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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