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The Neural Basis of Social Cognition: Using EEG Measurse to Explore False-Belief Processing Across the Lifespan.

Bradford, Elisabeth E.F., Brunsdon, Victoria E.A., Ferguson, Heather J. (2017) The Neural Basis of Social Cognition: Using EEG Measurse to Explore False-Belief Processing Across the Lifespan. In: Social and Affective Neuroscience Society (SANS) Conference, 16-18th March, 2017, Los Angeles, California, USA. (Unpublished) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)

Abstract

Theory of Mind (ToM), or social cognition, refers to the ability to understand, compute, and attribute mental states. Previous research has shown that even in healthy ageing, declines in social-cognitive abilities are often seen. The research presented here recruited younger (18-35 years-old) and older (60+ years-old) healthy adults to explore the neural basis of changes in social-cognition across the lifespan. Using EEG measures, we investigated the neural responses of older and younger participants when listening to stories involving true- or false-belief scenarios. In the stories, a character was described as having a true- or false-belief about an object’s location, before acting in a manner consistent or inconsistent with this ascribed belief-state. Participants also completed questionnaires (including the Autism Quotient and Empathy Quotient) to assess self-report measures of general social abilities, and how these may predict individual differences in belief-state processing. Results revealed differences in how true- and false-belief states were processed, with a significant role of belief-consistent versus belief-inconsistent outcomes; when the story character possessed a false-belief, belief-consistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 component than belief-inconsistent outcomes. These distinctions were more pronounced in older adults than in younger adults, suggesting a difference in how belief-states are processed.

Item Type: Conference or workshop item (Poster)
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Psychology
Depositing User: L. Bradford
Date Deposited: 27 Jul 2017 15:24 UTC
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2020 04:13 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/62419 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Bradford, Elisabeth E.F.: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7647-0891
Ferguson, Heather J.: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1575-4820
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