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Mandated Political Representation and Redistribution

Mitra, Anirban (2017) Mandated Political Representation and Redistribution. Economica, 85 (338). pp. 266-280. ISSN 0013-0427. (doi:10.1111/ecca.12249) (KAR id:62163)


Mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts where only minority–group candidates are permitted to contest. This paper builds a political economy model to analyse the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium. The model predicts that, in situations where the minority is economically disadvantaged and where voters exhibit an in–group bias, such a quota can reduce transfers to poorer groups. This suggests that the gains to the minority group from having such quotas are unevenly distributed. Redistribution

in reserved districts leads to a rise in within–group inequality for the minorities.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1111/ecca.12249
Uncontrolled keywords: Political economy, quotas, redistribution
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Funders: The Research Council of Norway (
Depositing User: Anirban Mitra
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2017 08:23 UTC
Last Modified: 09 Dec 2022 01:37 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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