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A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy

Allouch, Nizar (2012) A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy. Economic Theory, 53 (1). pp. 269-282. (doi:10.1007/s00199-012-0689-z.) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:60624)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0689-z.

Abstract

The warm-glow model (Andreoni in J Political Econ 97:1447-1458, 1989; Econ J 100:464-477, 1990) of public goods provision has received widespread interest, yet surprisingly most attention has focused on the voluntary contribution equilibrium of the model, and only very little attention has been devoted to the competitive equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce the concept of competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy (henceforth, warm-glow equilibrium) and establish both existence and welfare properties. The warm-glow equilibrium concept may prove to be very useful to the normative and positive theory of public goods provision. First, it is a price-based mechanism achieving efficient outcomes. Second, not only could the warm-glow equilibria outcomes serve as a point of reference to measure free-riding and welfare loss but also, as suggested by Bernheim and Rangel (Behavioral Economics and Its Applications, 2007), in large economies they may be approximated by Walrasian equilibria outcomes.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s00199-012-0689-z.
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Nizar Allouch
Date Deposited: 03 Mar 2017 16:05 UTC
Last Modified: 06 May 2020 03:15 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/60624 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Allouch, Nizar: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8046-4662
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