Reason’s Disunity with Itself: Comments on Adrian Moore on Kant’s Dialectic of Human Reason

Kanterian, Edward (2016) Reason’s Disunity with Itself: Comments on Adrian Moore on Kant’s Dialectic of Human Reason. Kantian Review, 21 (3). pp. 483-493. ISSN 1369-4154. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000224) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000224

Abstract

Adrian Moore develops a helpful distinction between good and bad metaphysics. Employing this distinction, I argue, first, that some contemporary metaphysical theories might be ‘bad’, insofar as they employ, unreflectively, concepts akin to Kant’s Ideas of reason. Second, I investigate the difficulty Kant himself has with explaining our craving for bad metaphysics. Third, I raise some problems for Kant’s doctrine of ‘transcendental cognition’, which rests on the difficult assumption that Ideas have objective reality. I conclude that, while Kant has given us means to combat certain bad metaphysics, his own philosophy is not entirely free of it either.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Jacqui Martlew
Date Deposited: 15 Feb 2017 10:55 UTC
Last Modified: 17 Feb 2017 09:21 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/60381 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
ORCiD (Kanterian, Edward): http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2666-6655
  • Depositors only (login required):