Reason’s Disunity with Itself: Comments on Adrian Moore on Kant’s Dialectic of Human Reason

Kanterian, Edward (2016) Reason’s Disunity with Itself: Comments on Adrian Moore on Kant’s Dialectic of Human Reason. Kantian Review, 21 (3). pp. 483-493. ISSN 1369-4154. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000224) (Full text available)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000224

Abstract

Adrian Moore develops a helpful distinction between good and bad metaphysics. Employing this distinction, I argue, first, that some contemporary metaphysical theories might be ‘bad’, insofar as they employ, unreflectively, concepts akin to Kant’s Ideas of reason. Second, I investigate the difficulty Kant himself has with explaining our craving for bad metaphysics. Third, I raise some problems for Kant’s doctrine of ‘transcendental cognition’, which rests on the difficult assumption that Ideas have objective reality. I conclude that, while Kant has given us means to combat certain bad metaphysics, his own philosophy is not entirely free of it either.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Edward Kanterian
Date Deposited: 15 Feb 2017 10:55 UTC
Last Modified: 05 May 2017 09:09 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/60381 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Kanterian, Edward: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2666-6655
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