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Probabilistic Knowledge and Cognitive Ability

Konek, Jason (2016) Probabilistic Knowledge and Cognitive Ability. Philosophical Review, 125 (4). pp. 509-587. ISSN 0031-8108. (doi:10.1215/00318108-3624754) (KAR id:59927)


Moss (2013) argues that degrees of belief or credences can amount to knowledge in much the way that full beliefs can. This paper explores a new kind of objective Bayesianism designed to take us some way toward securing such knowledge-constituting credences, or 'probabilistic knowledge'. Whatever else it takes for an agent’s credences to amount to knowledge, their success, or accuracy must be the product of cognitive ability or skill. The brand of Bayesianism developed here helps ensure this ability condition is satisfied. Cognitive ability, in turn, helps make credences valuable in other ways: it helps mitigate their dependence on epistemic luck, for example. What we end up with, at the end of the day, are credences that are particularly good candidates for constituting probabilistic knowledge. What’s more, examining the character of these credences teaches us something important about what the pursuit of probabilistic knowledge demands from us. It does not demand that we give hypotheses equal treatment, by affording them equal credence. Rather, it demands that we give them equal consideration, by affording them an equal chance of being discovered.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1215/00318108-3624754
Uncontrolled keywords: Probabilistic Knowledge, Cognitive Skill, Accuracy, Explanation
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User: J.P. Konek
Date Deposited: 19 Jan 2017 11:53 UTC
Last Modified: 08 Dec 2022 21:32 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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