Cartwright, Edward, Stepanova, Anna (2017) Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. International Journal of Game Theory, . ISSN 0020-7276. (doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1) (KAR id:59054)
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Language: English 
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| Official URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1 |
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Abstract
We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| DOI/Identification number: | 10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1 |
| Uncontrolled keywords: | Public good, threshold, impulse balance theory, quantal response, forced contribution, ordinal potential |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| Depositing User: | Anna Stepanova |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Nov 2016 11:04 UTC |
| Last Modified: | 16 Feb 2021 13:39 UTC |
| Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/59054 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
| Cartwright, Edward: |  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368 |
| Stepanova, Anna: | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1965-842X |
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