Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game

Cartwright, Edward and Stepanova, Anna (2017) Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. International Journal of Game Theory, . ISSN 0020-7276. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1) (Full text available)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1

Abstract

We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Public good, threshold, impulse balance theory, quantal response, forced contribution, ordinal potential
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Anna Stepanova
Date Deposited: 25 Nov 2016 11:04 UTC
Last Modified: 08 Jun 2017 08:51 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/59054 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Cartwright, Edward: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
Stepanova, Anna: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1965-842X
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