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What is the impact of bankrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efficiency?

Mamatzakis, Emmanuel, Matousek, Roman, Vu, Anh Nguyet (2016) What is the impact of bankrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efficiency? Journal of Banking and Finance, 72 . S187-S202. ISSN 0378-4266. (doi:doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.04.010) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.04.010

Abstract

The Japanese banking system provides a distinctive platform for the examination of the long-lasting effect of problem loans on efficiency. We measure technical efficiency by modifying a translog enhanced hyperbolic distance function with two undesirable outputs, identified as problem loans and problem other earning assets. Our unique database allows us to distinguish between bankrupt and restructured loans to investigate the underlying causality between these loans and efficiency. From the flexible panel vector autoregression specification, primary results reveal that bankrupt loans have a positive impact on efficiency related to the “moral hazard, skimping” hypothesis, with the causality originating from bankrupt loans. In contrast, findings for the relationship between restructured loans and efficiency support the “bad luck” hypothesis.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.04.010
Uncontrolled keywords: Bank efficiency; Bankrupt loans; Restructured loans; Panel VAR; Japan
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > Kent Business School
Depositing User: Roman Matousek
Date Deposited: 23 Jun 2016 21:07 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 17:27 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/55862 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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