Inside vs. Outside Lobbying: How the Institutional Framework Shapes the Lobbying Behavior of Interest Groups

Weiler, Florian and Brändli, Matthias (2015) Inside vs. Outside Lobbying: How the Institutional Framework Shapes the Lobbying Behavior of Interest Groups. European Journal of Political Research, 54 (4). pp. 745-766. ISSN 0304-4130. E-ISSN 1475-6765. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12106) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12106

Abstract

Different types of interest groups use different lobbying strategies. In this paper, we investigate this already well-established hypothesis once more, but in addition we propose that the institutional framework of the country in which interest groups operate also influence their lobbying behavior. More specifically, it is shown that groups working in the interest of the public are better integrated into the policy making process when direct democratic instruments, such as referendums, occur regularly (as in Switzerland), than when referendums are the exception (Germany). We demonstrate that Swiss cause groups, often also referred to as public interest groups in the literature, use a more balance mix of insider and outsider strategies than their German peers, but also that this moderating effect cannot be found for specific interest groups such as industry groups or unions.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: interest group strategies; inside lobbying; outside lobbying; electoral institutions; direct democracy
Subjects: J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Depositing User: F. Weiler
Date Deposited: 13 Apr 2016 11:39 UTC
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2017 23:00 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/54942 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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