Alberti, Federica, Cartwright, Edward (2016) Full Agreement and the Provision of Threshold Public Goods. Public Choice, 166 (1). pp. 205-233. ISSN 0048-5829. E-ISSN 1573-7101. (doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0321-z) (KAR id:54267)
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0321-z |
Abstract
The experimental evidence suggests that groups are inefficient at providing threshold public goods. This inefficiency appears to reflect an inability to coordinate over how to distribute the cost of providing the good. So, why do groups not just split the cost equally? We offer an answer to this question by demonstrating that in a standard threshold public good game there is no collectively rational recommendation. We also demonstrate that if full agreement is required in order to provide the public good then there is a collectively rational recommendation, namely, to split the cost equally. Requiring full agreement may, therefore, increase efficiency in providing threshold public goods. We test this hypothesis experimentally and find support for it.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1007/s11127-016-0321-z |
Uncontrolled keywords: | Public good, threshold, full agreement, focal point, experiment, coordination |
Subjects: |
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Edward Cartwright |
Date Deposited: | 24 Feb 2016 14:22 UTC |
Last Modified: | 09 Dec 2022 04:23 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/54267 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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