Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism?

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, Jeffrey (2017) Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism? American Philosophical Quarterly, 54 (2). pp. 183-194. ISSN 0003-0481. E-ISSN 2152-1123. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Abstract

Reliabilism -- the view that a belief is justified iff it is produced by a reliable process -- is often characterized as a form of consequentialism. Recently, critics of reliabilism have suggested that, since a form of consequentialism, reliabilism condones a variety of problematic trade-offs, involving cases where someone forms an epistemically deficient belief now that will lead her to more epistemic value later. In the present paper, we argue that the relevant argument against reliabilism fails because it equivocates. While there is a sense in which reliabilism is a kind of consequentialism, it is not of a kind on which we should expect problematic trade-offs.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2016 19:53 UTC
Last Modified: 20 Nov 2017 13:07 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/53712 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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