The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games

Cartwright, Edward and Stepanova, Anna (2015) The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games. Economics Letters, 134 . pp. 29-33. ISSN 0165-1765. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032

Abstract

We revisit the question of whether a refund increases efficiency in threshold public good games. New experimental evidence is presented on the effect of endowment size. We demonstrate that a refund increases efficiency if and only if the endowment is small relative to the threshold. We also propose a novel way to analyze the effect of a refund. Specifically, we argue that a refund increases efficiency only if significantly many groups converge towards zero contributions in the absence of a refund.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Public good; Threshold; Refund; Money back guarantee
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 23 Oct 2015 07:01 UTC
Last Modified: 26 Oct 2015 14:37 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/51216 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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