Cartwright, Edward, Stepanova, Anna (2015) The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games. Economics Letters, 134 . pp. 29-33. ISSN 0165-1765. (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:51216)
| The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
| Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032 |
Abstract
We revisit the question of whether a refund increases efficiency in threshold public good games. New experimental evidence is presented on the effect of endowment size. We demonstrate that a refund increases efficiency if and only if the endowment is small relative to the threshold. We also propose a novel way to analyze the effect of a refund. Specifically, we argue that a refund increases efficiency only if significantly many groups converge towards zero contributions in the absence of a refund.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| DOI/Identification number: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032 |
| Uncontrolled keywords: | Public good; Threshold; Refund; Money back guarantee |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| Depositing User: | Edward Cartwright |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Oct 2015 07:01 UTC |
| Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 10:37 UTC |
| Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/51216 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
University of Kent Author Information
Cartwright, Edward.
| Creator's ORCID: |
 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
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|---|---|
| CReDIT Contributor Roles: |
Stepanova, Anna.
| Creator's ORCID: |
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1965-842X
|
|---|---|
| CReDIT Contributor Roles: |
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