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Behavioral conformity in games with many players

Cartwright, Edward, Wooders, Myrna, Selten, Reinhard (2006) Behavioral conformity in games with many players. Games and Economic Behavior, 57 (2). pp. 347-360. ISSN 0899-8256. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:504)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006

Abstract

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to that of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such conformity can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few societies, each consisting of similar individuals playing similar strategies. In this paper we characterize a family of games admitting the existence of such equilibrium. We also introduce the concept of 'crowding types' into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player-those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others-and his tastes. With assumptions of 'within crowding type anonymity' and 'linearity of taste-types' we show that the number of societies can be uniformly bounded.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: C. Hudson
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:17 UTC
Last Modified: 11 Dec 2023 11:38 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/504 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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